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On very rare occasions, in-flight emergencies have occurred that required the pilot to 
utilize the aircraft's capabilities to the fullest extent possible, sometimes using actuators in 
ways for which they were not intended. For instance, when flight control has been lost due to 
damage to the hydraulic systems, pilots have had to use engine thrust to maneuver the plane 
to the ground and in for a landing. To assist the pilot in these situations, research is being 
performed to enhance the engine operation by making it more responsive or able to generate 
more thrust. Enabled by modification of the propulsion control, enhanced engine operation 
can increase the probability of a safe landing during an in-flight emergency.  However, 
enhanced engine operation introduces risk as the nominal control limits, such as those on 
shaft speed, temperature, and acceleration, are exceeded.  Therefore, an on-line tool for 
quantifying this risk must be developed to ensure that the use of an enhanced control mode 
does not actually increase the overall danger to the aircraft. This paper describes an 
architecture for the implementation of this tool. It describes the type of data and algorithms 
required and the information flow, and how the risk based on engine component lifing and 
operability for enhanced operation is determined. 
I. Introduction 
N 1989, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10, United Airlines flight 232, suffered an uncontained failure in the tail 
engine. The fan disk failed and disintegrated which caused pieces of the structure to strike and destroy part of the 
tail and the horizontal stabilizer. As a result of this failure, all three of the hydraulic lines were cut, allowing the 
hydraulic fluid to drain away, disabling the flight control surfaces (i.e., ailerons, rudder, and all other flaps used to 
steer and control speed of the aircraft). Thus the pilots were forced to use the wing-mounted engines to steer the 
plane, using differential thrust to turn, and using additional or less thrust to control altitude. One of the serious 
problems the pilots faced was controlling the phugoid mode (long period pitch oscillations resulting in speed and 
altitude variations) which the control surfaces normally damp out. The pilots were able to learn to control this mode 
(to some extent) with properly timed changes in thrust (the delay time was as much as 20 to 40 seconds). Upon 
approach, the pilots found it was difficult to stay lined up with the runway. Additionally, the plane was coming in 
fast at 215 knots indicated air speed with a high sink rate of 1620 feet per minute. The plane crash landed and 111 of 
the 296 on board were killed in the accident; however it is remarkable that this many lives were spared considering 
the circumstances.1 
In August 2006, a Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ-100ER, Comair Flight 5191, was assigned to take-off 
on Runway 22 of Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, KY. The pilots instead mistakenly used Runway 26, which was far 
too short for a safe takeoff, resulting in the aircraft overrunning the end of the runway before it could become 
airborne. The aircraft collided with terrain, trees and a fence, killing forty-nine people on board. Post-crash analysis 
indicated that the aircraft had not quite reached takeoff speed when impact occurred. It was also concluded that the 
flight crew realized something was wrong, but beyond the point at which the airplane could be stopped on the 
remaining available runway.2 
Both of these catastrophes could have potentially been avoided if the engines had had the ability to respond faster 
or provide additional thrust. These and similar accidents demonstrate the desirability of enhanced propulsion control 
modes for in-flight emergency situations.3 However, high-bypass gas turbine engines (these are the main engines 
used for large transport aircraft) are designed to provide safe and efficient operation over a long life. As a result, 
they accelerate slowly to minimize exposure of parts to extremely high temperatures and to minimize the chance of 
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Figure 1. Risk Management Architecture. 
stall. Since the deployment of an enhanced control mode for emergency operation could pose some danger to the 
engine, the risk of such an action under the given circumstances should be evaluated. 
A Risk Management Architecture has been proposed for enhanced engine operation under emergency 
conditions.4 The function of the Risk Management Architecture is to coordinate the engine control system with the 
flight control system to find the propulsion control mode or overall reconfiguration strategy that gives the airplane 
the best chance for a safe recovery in an emergency. This involves weighing the risk of an unsuccessful landing with 
the risk of implementing the enhanced control mode. The use of an enhanced control mode is intended to improve 
the chance of a safe landing, but will in general be more dangerous than using the standard propulsion control. This 
Risk Management Architecture, shown in Figure 1, contains multiple components or subsystems. The Engine Life 
and Operability Risk Assessment block contains the Risk Assessment Architecture, which is the subject of this 
paper. This subsystem evaluates the risk of performing a particular control action, specified at a higher level in the 
Risk Management Architecture. The Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment block accepts requirements for 
the enhanced engine operation including the risk that the flight control system is willing to accept, and estimates the 
risk of using the specified control mode under the given circumstances. It returns information useful in decision 
making, such as the risk that will be incurred by performing the action, and limits on the control action so that the 
acceptable risk level will be met if the requested action’s risk would exceed it. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The FAA requirements for engine performance and 
operability are described, and these requirements are then related to the prognostic approach. Enhanced engine 
operation is discussed next. This is followed by a description of the components that make up the Risk Assessment 
Architecture, after which examples are presented demonstrating the information flow in two representative, 
hypothetical enhanced control modes. 
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II. Engine Life and Operability Prognosis 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has mandated that engine components, both rotor and major static 
structural parts, be considered “life-limited” if their primary failure “is likely to result in a hazardous engine effect,”5 
and thus these parts must be removed from service at an approved life before hazardous engine effects can occur. A 
hazardous engine effect has the potential to be catastrophic; it is one that, among other things, results in non-
containment of high-energy debris (e.g., disk burst), failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent 
engine separation, or uncontrolled fire.6 The safe life of these life-limited parts must be determined by the 
manufacturer such that hazardous engine effects (which could be due to cascading failures) are predicted to occur at 
a rate not in excess of that defined as extremely remote (probability range of 10-7 to 10-9 per engine flight hour). The 
probability of a hazardous engine effect arising from an individual failure should be predicted to be not greater than 
10-8 per engine flight hour. Thus, when seeking to certify an engine, the applicant must analyze it to assess the likely 
consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. Normal engine operation will naturally 
promote certain failure modes such as high- and low-cycle fatigue, creep, etc., and the manufacturer’s analysis must 
account for variations in the assorted factors that influence life, and the interaction between these factors. An engine 
failure in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of thrust or power is considered a minor engine 
effect; although this is an undesirable event, it is not likely to be catastrophic under normal circumstances, and if it 
occurs in only one engine of a multi-engine aircraft it might be of little consequence. By definition then, an effect 
whose severity falls between hazardous and minor is regarded as a major engine effect, and the manufacturer’s 
analysis must show that they are predicted to occur at a rate not in excess of that defined as remote (probability 
range of 10-5 to 10-7 per engine flight hour). These characterizations are useful because they classify the severity of 
failure modes and demonstrate that a quantifiable risk can be associated with these failures. Certification 
additionally requires some limited operational testing of rotating components beyond normal maximums to 
demonstrate integrity,7 so while the failure risk in these cases cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms, the 
tests appear to establish a minimum safe life at these conditions. 
The FAA also requires testing to certify that an engine can accelerate from low to high power within a specified 
time, and additionally that the engine can accelerate without experiencing overtemperature, surge, stall, or other 
detrimental factors.8 This means that the controller must be designed to achieve a minimum performance in terms of 
transient response, while protecting the engine’s operability by ensuring safe operation during extreme throttle 
excursions. Not only that, the controller is designed such that it will maintain these standards throughout the life of 
the engine, even though the engine is subject to normal wear and tear that makes it more susceptible to stall and 
overtemperature as it ages. This type of robust design essentially guarantees the engine’s operation between 
overhauls under normal use. One can infer from this that a new engine might have the ability to respond faster 
without any detrimental effects, if the controller demanded it, since a deteriorated engine is still capable of operating 
safely. Nonetheless, it is common practice to limit the acceleration of turbofan engines to a standard profile in multi-
engine aircraft, one that even the most deteriorated engine can achieve, in order to reduce the impact of mismatched 
engines and thereby minimize the potential for yaw on take-off.9 
The FAA’s certification requirements for engines take into account life, performance, and operability. These 
three attributes are evaluated independently, but are intimately tied together in practice. The safe life of life-limited 
parts is determined based on normal use, which is related to the steady state and transient performance of the engine, 
realizing that as the engine wears it runs hotter. The exhaust gas temperature is a gauge of engine deterioration, and 
it is used to indicate when maintenance is required; this presumably limits the maximum temperatures the internal 
engine components will experience. The operability of the engine is also related to how the engine deteriorates with 
use. Engine performance is maintained during large transients even as the engine ages, albeit with less available stall 
margin. Thus the closed-loop system must be designed with enough stall margin to deliver consistently acceptable 
response, which means that the maximum amount of stall margin debit due to deterioration between overhauls can 
be anticipated. Thus, under normal operation, the engine is well-characterized in terms of life, performance and 
operability. 
Under normal circumstances, the conservative design of the engine’s controller enables the engine to have long 
on-wing life and robust operation. In the case of an emergency, such as loss of flight control capability or runway 
incursion, allowing the engine to take advantage of its reserve capabilities could provide the extra boost required to 
save the plane from crashing. However, once the controller is modified to allow the additional responsiveness, there 
is no longer any guarantee of safe operation. Faster response leads to potential stall, and greater-than-normal thrust 
can lead to dramatically shortened life. Even a minor engine effect (recall that this is defined as partial or complete 
loss of thrust) could become catastrophic when the engine is being relied upon to maneuver the aircraft out of 
harm’s way. Therefore, the ability to modify the controller to take advantage of the unused performance and 
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operability margin must be coupled with a way to determine the risk of performing the requested action, and that 
risk can then be weighed against the risk to the vehicle if the action is not performed. 
III. Enhanced Engine Operation 
The propulsion system’s enhanced control modes are based on the types of emergencies that have occurred 
historically for which greater capabilities could have potentially improved the probability of safe recovery. Based on 
the previously described scenarios, beyond-normal thrust (overthust) and faster-than-normal control responses are 
being considered. There may be multiple ways to achieve these types of responses, so any individual control mode is 
a specific approach to meet the requirement. Naturally the way the objective is met will determine the likely failure 
modes, so specific failure modes must be determined for each control mode. For instance, attempting to achieve a 
faster-than–normal thrust response by modifying the engine controller’s limit logic might result in high pressure 
compressor (HPC) stall on acceleration (operability). Higher-than-normal thrust produced by allowing excessive 
rotational speed could result in failures such as disk burst and stress rupture failure of the blades (life).  
When an emergency situation is recognized, the flight controller portion of the Risk Management Architecture 
(Figure 1) evaluates the situation and determines the engine requirements for enhanced operation that will improve 
the chance for recovery or safe landing. The enhanced engine capability might, for instance, make the vehicle 
reasonably maneuverable despite damaged flight control surfaces. From the point of view of the flight control, the 
engines are merely actuators, and if they can provide the requested response the situation is less dire. However, 
enhanced engine operation is inherently risky. There might be various enhanced control modes available to achieve 
a desired response, or various degrees of achieving it; this is up to the Control Mode Selector and Risk Management 
block to determine. To facilitate this, the flight controller must specify the level of risk it is willing to accept with 
enhanced engine operation so that the overall chance of survival is maximized. Thus the flight controller’s 
performance request is converted into a proposed enhanced control mode with specifications about its 
implementation. If it is determined to be too risky, other control modes can be evaluated, initiated by the Control 
Mode Selector and Risk Management block, or the flight controller’s performance requirements or acceptable risk 
can be modified. This iteration and negotiation to arrive at an appropriate response with an acceptable risk is the 
function of the Risk Management Architecture. The risk determination for any specific enhanced control mode is 
performed by the Risk Assessment Architecture. 
IV. Risk Assessment Architecture 
The purpose of the Risk Assessment Architecture is to evaluate the risk of performing a specified action under 
the given circumstances. This is accomplished through the use of sets of algorithms specific to the enhanced control 
modes. These algorithms, which are designed to address each of the developed enhanced control modes based on the 
given engine and airframe combination, fit within the generic Risk Assessment Architecture. Although there are two 
distinct concerns—life and operability—the primary output of the Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment 
block is a risk level, so whether it is a risk to life or operability or a combination of both, the result is a likelihood or 
probability. Thus the architecture provides a generic structure in which to compute risk, independent of cause or 
effect. 
The Risk Assessment Architecture has three main components: the database of engine characteristics required for 
risk calculation; a set of algorithms to determine risk based on the various enhanced control modes; and the on-line, 
real-time information computed based on (normal) past use and anticipated enhanced use in an emergency situation. 
The set of algorithms to determine risk operates on the database of engine characteristics so that together they 
produce the on-line, real-time information. The Risk Assessment Architecture is shown in context in Figure 2. The 
three components comprising it are described next.  
A. Database of engine characteristics 
The database of engine characteristics contains information specific to the engine, such as number of disks, 
diameter of each disk, number of blades per disk, material properties, etc. This is general information about the 
engine, independent of any specific enhanced control modes, that can be used for computing risk of operation for 
any given control mode. The type of information required to be contained within the database will, of course, 
depend upon the control modes that need to be analyzed, but the information itself is fundamental. The cross section 
of a turbofan engine is shown in Figure 3. In the figure, the air moves from left to right, through the fan which 
generates most of the thrust by pushing a large amount of air through the bypass duct (the large diameter annulus on 
the left). A small percentage of the air travels through the core (the part behind the fan that extends to the right) and 
is compressed, mixed with fuel and burned, and then expanded out through the turbine, driving the fan. Under 
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Figure 2. Block Diagram of the Risk Assessment Architecture (the framework of the Engine Life and 
Operability Risk Assessment block) as a subset of the Risk Management Architecture (Figure 1). 
normal conditions, the moving parts of the engine, which can weigh several thousand pounds in total, rotate about 
the central horizontal shafts at speeds of thousands of rpm, and the temperature of the hot gas can be well in excess 
of 2000° F. Clearly the potential for catastrophic damage exists if the engine is driven beyond its safety limits. 
The FAA currently requires that lifing analysis be performed on parts whose failure can result in a hazardous 
engine effect under normal use. Failure modes that can reasonably be expected to occur and would result in 
hazardous engine effect under enhanced use can be analyzed in the same way. For example, Figure 4 shows the life 
distribution of turbine blades of a given material for a range of temperatures and stresses.10 The life decreases 
exponentially as temperature and stress (which is a 
function of rotational speed) increase. Figure 5 
shows the relationship between the life of a 
particular kind of disk and rotational speed.11 Here 
again life decreases exponentially with speed. 
These two figures are examples of the type of 
information that might be required to calculate the 
risk of operating in an overspeed control mode to 
produce additional thrust. 
B. Risk assessment algorithms for enhanced 
control modes 
The algorithms that determine risk due to 
exercising a specific control mode are naturally 
control mode dependent. Since the possible 
enhanced control modes are known, the Figure 3. Turbofan engine cross section. 
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Figure 4. Example turbine blade material life 
based on stress and temperature. 
Figure 5. Example normalized characteristic life of a
disk as a function of rotational disk speed. 
algorithms required for computing the risk 
associated with their deployment are 
preprogrammed. Thus the request to initiate a 
specific enhanced control mode automatically 
starts the process of activating the correct 
algorithms. Different failure modes might be 
dominant if the engine is stressed in different 
ways, and the risk of failure is related to the 
failure mode excited and how it manifests itself. 
The algorithms can include physics-based 
models of structural life, or statistical tests, and 
they use the information contained in the 
database as well as current information about the 
engine’s state and future operation. 
C. On-line, real-time information 
The on-line information generated by the 
Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment 
block is a risk of performing a certain operation, 
information related to the risk or to the 
acceptable risk, or some information used to help 
compute the risk. The information is produced by 
applying the algorithms to the contents of the 
database, with the situation-specific details that 
make the results relevant. 
V. Information Flow 
The Risk Assessment Architecture has been 
described in general terms, but the information 
flow is most easily demonstrated through the use 
of examples. At a high level, the risk factors of 
concern are stall and component failure, the first 
would usually be expected to occur during fast 
response, and the second during overthrust. Of 
course the risk depends on the implementation of 
the enhanced control mode, but for 
demonstration purposes we will assume that a 
specific control mode exists for each type of 
operation. A flow chart for the risk assessment 
process is shown in Figure 6. In the following 
descriptions, hypothetical control modes are 
described; these example computations are the 
type that would be carried out in a real 
implementation.  
A. Fast response control mode 
For a large rapid throttle movement, the 
controller limit logic will usually determine the 
engine’s thrust response time.12 The limit logic 
usually contains some type of acceleration 
schedule. A common type of acceleration 
schedule, known as NDOT,13 specifies core 
acceleration as a function of core speed. This is 
because at low speed, the high pressure 
compressor (HPC) is likely to stall during rapid 
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Figure 6. Flow chart of the risk assessment process for the use of enhanced propulsion control. The 
risk assessment algorithms are predefined based on the control mode selected. 
accelerations and so it must be tightly controlled. The HPC is designed such that its operating line is far enough 
from its stall line to ensure that it will never stall under normal operation; this distance, called the stall margin (SM), 
is defined in Figure 7. The required stall margin consists of a stack-up of several components, the largest of which is 
the transient allowance, i.e., the amount set aside for the temporary stall margin decrease due to transient operation. 
The size of the dip in stall margin due to the transient depends upon the speed of response—the faster the response, 
the larger the dip (Figure 8).14 As previously stated, the propensity to stall is related to the level of engine 
deterioration, and a new engine often has the capability to accelerate more quickly than an older engine. However, 
the acceleration schedule must be designed for any engine of the same type in the fleet, and be valid throughout the 
engine’s life, therefore it must allow even the most deteriorated engine operating under the worst conditions to 
accelerate safely. The Risk Management Architecture (Figure 1) contains a block called Engine Condition 
Monitoring that feeds into both the Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment and the Control Mode Selector and 
Risk Management blocks. For this example, the Engine Condition Monitoring block would contain algorithms that 
might estimate the level of deterioration of the engine, or even a measure of how close the engine’s operating line is 
to stall.15,16 Now, say that a family of acceleration schedules has been developed, appropriate for various levels of 
engine deterioration, and the most conservative schedule is the nominal schedule used in the controller. If the 
damaged flight control system determines that to damp the phugoid mode, for instance, the engine response time 
constant must be decreased to some particular value, the Control Mode Selector might request an evaluation of the 
risk of using a more aggressive acceleration schedule that would produce such a response, at the cost of a smaller 
stall margin transiently. The Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment block would use the estimate of engine 
deterioration generated by the Engine Condition Monitoring block, as well as information about the accuracy of that 
estimate, to determine if the risk of implementing that acceleration schedule is acceptable according to what the 
flight control system has specified. 
Reference 9 lists the contributors to the HPC stall margin worst case stack-up, i.e., the various factors that must 
be accounted for to ensure that the engine does not stall on acceleration; they are shown in Table 1. The total of 
24.4% indicates the distance the HPC’s designed steady state working line must be from the stall line in order to 
ensure safe operation throughout the life of the engine under normal use. Some of the components of the stack-up 
are random, the remaining are systematic deviances related to deterioration or type of operation. Potentially some of 
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Figure 7. Pressure Ratio (PR) of HPC vs. Mass
Flow Rate, showing how Stall Margin (SM) is defined. 
Table 1. Example of stall margin stack-up for the HPC 
Cause Systematic Deviances 
Random 
Variances
New production engine-to-engine working line variation  0 ± 1.5% 
New production engine-to-engine stall line variation 0 ± 4.0% 
In service working line deterioration -2.0%  
In service stall line deterioration -4.0%  
Control system fuel metering, and other actuators 0 ± 1.0% 
Reynolds number effects  -1.0%  
Inlet distortion -1.0%  
Transient allowance -12%  
Total -20% ± 4.4% 
the latter group can be estimated. The deterioration-
related stall margin debits would be estimated and 
made available by the Engine Condition Monitoring 
block, and the inlet distortion might be able to be 
estimated using airframe parameters such as angle 
of attack and sideslip. This type of information 
enables the  required stall margin reserve to be 
reduced because the portion required for each 
component of the stack-up that is estimated will 
usually be less than its corresponding worst case 
(three sigma) stall margin set-aside. This means that 
it is known with some confidence that the whole 
reserve is not required and the unneeded portion 
may now be utilized for the transient. 
Let us assume that each of the components of 
the baseline stall margin stack-up shown in Table 1 
represents a worst case (three sigma), and that each 
is independent (after lumping the two deterioration 
debits together), and that there exists an unbiased 
estimator for those non-random components of the 
stack-up that are able to be determined. 
Furthermore, let us assume that the random 
components of the stack-up and the estimation errors are independent and normally distributed random variables. 
The portion of the stack-up due to random components (engine-to-engine working line and stall line variation, and 
actuator variation) is accounted for in the stall margin by utilizing the facts that 1) the sum of normally distributed 
variables is normally distributed, and 2) the variance of this sum of normally distributed random variables is the sum 
of the variances of the individual normally distributed random variables. Since the standard deviation is the square 
root of the variance, the standard deviation of the new distribution is easily determined from those of the original 
distributions. Under normal circumstances, the one-sided three-sigma value might be used as the stall margin 
component due to random effects, as in Eq. (1). 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1/ 2 1/2 1/22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 33 3 3 9 3 3σ + σ + σ = σ + σ +σ = σ + σ + σ = σ  (1) 
With estimators for the other components of the stall margin stack-up, the risk can be bounded in a similar way, 
using the fact that the estimation error is a random variable. For instance, Ref. 16 describes an approach that has 
been demonstrated in simulation to produce an unbiased estimate of HPC stall margin with a standard deviation 
significantly less than the deterioration-induced debit. Incorporating any such estimation errors into the stack-up due 
to random variations (as in Eq. (1)), and setting the acceptable risk to, say, 3% (2σ) gives the equation 
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Figure 9. Normally distributed unbiased
estimation error with 3% risk acceptable. This approach
applies to any random component of the stall margin
stack-up. 
Figure 8. Nominal and rapid thrust response and
corresponding HPC stall margin (SM) trajectories vs.
time. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1/ 222 2 21 2 32 2 2 2 2estimation errorσ + σ + σ + σ = σ  (2) 
where 2σ corresponds to about 97% of the one-sided normal distribution, ensuring that the estimate of the 
deterioration-induced stall margin debit is greater than the actual debit with a probability of about 0.97 (see Figure 
9). Note that the coefficients in Eq. (2) do not need to all be the same—for instance if nothing is known about a 
particular component of the stack-up it might be unwise to reduce its debit—as long as the acceptable risk from the 
resulting distribution is as specified. 
The original required stall margin (worst case stack-up) is now known to be larger than necessary. The 
unnecessary amount is determined as the difference between the set-aside (worst case) and requirement for each 
estimated component, less the estimation uncertainty from Eq. (2). This part of the stack-up is now freed up to be 
used for the transient response. So, if the acceleration schedule required to produce the requested engine response 
generates a transient-related dip in stall margin that is less than the original transient allowance plus the unneeded 
portion of the original set-aside, the risk of implementing this acceleration schedule is less than the maximum 
acceptable risk. 
To synopsize this example demonstrating the 
information flow from Figure 6, say an aircraft’s 
rudder locks, causing yaw control to be lost. The 
Vehicle Risk Management block from Figure 1 
would request the Control Mode Selector and Risk 
Management block to implement a fast thrust 
response control mode to achieve yaw control with 
a specified bandwidth or time constant using rapid 
differential thrust modulation, without exceeding a 
given risk level. The Control Mode Selector and 
Risk Management block selects one of the pre-
existing fast thrust response strategies to achieve it 
(modified acceleration schedule, in this example) 
and sends the specific schedule and acceptable risk 
to the Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment 
block for analysis. The Engine Condition 
Monitoring block would provide an estimate of the 
engine’s deterioration level that can be related to 
stall margin debit, as well as the uncertainty 
associated with the estimate. The algorithms in the 
Risk Assessment Architecture would combine the 
uncertainty information using Eq. (2) to generate an 
estimate of the risk of using the new acceleration 
schedule, and this would be returned. 
B. Overthrust control mode 
To implement an overthrust control mode we 
can assume an overspeed operational mode. Thrust 
is proportional to airflow through the engine, which 
is directly related to both Engine Pressure Ratio 
(EPR, defined as Low Pressure Turbine discharge 
pressure divided by inlet pressure) and fan speed, so 
it is common to use one or the other as the control 
variable.13 Higher-than-normal thrust might be 
demanded due to, for instance, a shortened takeoff 
distance because of a runway incursion,3 or 
significant in-flight wing damage that reduces lift 
on that side of the aircraft.17 One way to achieve 
overthust is to increase the setpoint (fan speed or 
EPR) beyond the normal upper limit. If the higher-
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Figure 10. Two-parameter Weibull plot. 
than-normal thrust level is required for more than a very 
short time, it is a steady state condition and component 
life becomes a concern. Even under normal circumstances, 
time at temperature is a limiting factor in engine 
operation. For instance, maximum continuous thrust is the 
maximum thrust at which the engine may operate 
continuously while the higher takeoff thrust is the 
maximum thrust at which an engine is allowed to operate 
for a five minute duration (based on maximum exhaust 
temperature).13 This is because the stress on the hot section 
components at this condition tends to shorten their life 
significantly. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show examples of 
how the life is debited due to excessively harsh operation. 
We assume that component life is probabilistic, 
meaning that for a population of parts that are exposed to 
the same conditions, there is a distribution of failure times. 
As discussed earlier, the safe life of a part is the time 
before which no failure can be reasonably expected to 
occur, i.e., the probability of a failure is extremely remote. 
When dealing with a population of turbine disks, for 
example, the removal time is dictated by the risk of the first failure, even though 80% of parts replaced at low-cycle 
fatigue (LCF) calculated safe-life limits have at least a full order of magnitude of fatigue life remaining.18 This leads 
into the definition of risk. If the probability of the first failure occurring at the safe life is an acceptably low known 
value, and running for an additional 10 times as long as the safe-life limit results in only 20% of the disks having 
failed, then a two-parameter probability distribution, such as Weibull, can be generated as 
 ( ) 1 exp , 0tF t t
          
 (3) 
where α and β specify the distribution as shown in Figure 10. A Weibull plot is a Cumulative Distribution Function 
(CDF) that represents the probability of failure versus time using scaled axes so that the resulting line is straight. 
Weibull distributions are often used to represent failure behavior because they possess some important properties, 
and they have the versatility to suggest other distributions while retaining these properties. One important property is 
that Weibull distributions of individual components can be combined into a single Weibull distribution for an entire 
system as long as the β parameter for the individual distributions is equal. This is useful for simplifying the CDF for 
a large group of similar components such as disks or blades. Even when the β parameters are dissimilar and the 
CDFs cannot be combined, an analytical expression can be created for the CDF of system failures using the concept 
of survivability. 
The survivability of a component, S(t), can be defined as one minus the risk, F(t), which is equivalent to one 
minus the CDF, as shown below,  
 ( ) 1 ( )S t F t   (4) 
One way to combine multiple independent failure distributions into a single distribution for the engine is by 
calculating the survivability in Eq. (5). Note that the independence assumption is justified since any individual 
failure of the level of severity considered here would be enough to curtail the use of the enhanced control mode in an 
emergency situation. 
 1 2( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( )) (1 ( ))NS t F t F t F t     (5) 
Since, by manipulation of Eq. (4), the risk F(t) equals one minus the survivability S(t), Eq. (6) represents system risk 
as a function of component life. 
 1 2( ) 1 (1 ( ))(1 ( )) (1 ( ))NF t F t F t F t      (6) 
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Figure 11. Weibull plot of risk of operation 
engine in normal then enhanced mode. 
Note that, for analysis purposes, the individual risk 
terms of Eq. (6) corresponding to failure modes 
associated with enhanced operation might become 
nonzero only after the new control mode is initiated. 
Equations (4)-(6) are valid for any distribution, but the 
Weibull assumption simplifies the analysis. 
Equation (6) describes the risk to engine life in 
terms of structural failures that would be catastrophic 
in an overthrust control mode. When there are 
competing failure modes or specific failure modes 
associated with enhanced operation, the Weibull plot 
of the CDF may look more like that in Figure 11, but 
the analysis is the same. 
As an example to demonstrate the information 
flow shown in Figure 6 for an overthrust control 
mode, assume that a plane crosses the runway ahead 
of an aircraft that is in its full power takeoff roll. In 
order for the aircraft to reach takeoff speed and clear the obstacle, the engines must suddenly operate well above 
takeoff thrust level. From Figure 1, the Vehicle Risk Management block determines the acceleration requirements, 
which establishes how much thrust is required and for how long. This thrust request and associated acceptable risk 
are communicated to the Control Mode Selector and Risk Management block, which evaluates the request, and 
selects one of the pre-existing enhanced control strategies (overspeed, in this case) to achieve it.  This block also 
computes information necessary to determine risk, including operating point, defined by fan speed or EPR and 
ambient conditions, and corresponding steady state values for internal variables that have an impact on part life 
(speeds, temperatures, and pressures required to produce the desired thrust). The nominal values of these internal 
variables at the overspeed condition could be looked up, and adjusted up or down based on the estimate of the 
deterioration level provided by the Engine Condition Monitoring block. Now, the pertinent information is sent to the 
Engine Life and Operability Risk Assessment block with the request to analyze the risk of providing the desired level 
of thrust for the specified time. Since the control mode implementation is specific to the external conditions and the 
deterioration level of the engine, and the initial risk level depends on the life already consumed, which is provided 
by the Engine Condition Monitoring block, Eq. (6) would be customized and evaluated on a case-by-case basis, 
using information from the database such as that shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. For instance, stress, which is a 
function of rotational speed and distance from the centerline, would be computed for the enhanced control condition 
and combined with temperature to determine an expected blade life distribution. Many of these distributions would 
be combined into a single distribution for the blade set, and likewise, the disk life distributions would be combined. 
This would provide an overall risk for the engine. The computed risk is returned, along with other information such 
as how long the engine can operate at the stated condition until the acceptable risk level is crossed. 
VI. Summary 
The paper describes a Risk Assessment Architecture for on-line, real-time analysis of the implementation of an 
enhanced propulsion control mode in response to an emergency situation. The paper focuses on information flow 
and the role of the components of the architecture, specifically 1) the database of engine characteristics and 
properties that are used by the algorithms that compute risk; 2) the algorithms that compute risk, specific to the 
enhanced control mode to be implemented; and 3) real-time risk information that is a function of the current state of 
the engine and the specific situation. The information flow was demonstrated through the use of two examples with 
hypothetical enhanced control modes, one for fast response describing the evaluation process for determining risk of 
stall, the other for overthrust, demonstrating the calculation of engine life risk. The compelling feature of the 
architecture is that it computes and returns the risk of using the control mode, independent of the type of control 
mode. Additionally, because the failure modes are assumed to be independent, their associated risks can be 
combined if, for instance, there is a desire to implement a fast-responding overthrust control mode. Thus, the Risk 
Assessment Architecture is generic and control mode independent, only the actual algorithms used and the 
information they require are control mode specific.  
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